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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
It is apparent that the court has indulged in a vacillating construc-
tion of section 21-137. This construction has rendered the meaning of the
section uncertain. Litigants and attorneys, who must necessarily look to
statutory law for guidance in divorce proceedings, may justifiably hesitate
to place any reliance on the court's latest construction. That such a situa-
tion is undesirable is plainly evident. Since parents often become dis-
satisfied with custody orders and frequently institute modification pro-
ceedings with regard thereto, the number of litigants affected is substantial.
It appears that this situation might have been avoided if changes in the
construction of the statute had been left to the legislature.
THEODORE CORONTZOS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--LIABILITY FOR POLICE NEGLIGENCE-DUTY
TO PROTECT INFORMERs-Plaintiff's intestate son, in response to an FBI
flyer, furnished information to the New York police concerning the where-
abouts of the notorious criminal, Willie Sutton. His part in the capture
of Sutton was widely publicized. Thereafter he received threats against
the safety of himself and his family, and was afforded police protection
for a short while. The threats continued but police protection was dis-
continued in spite of request. He was shot to death three weeks later,
walking home from work. An action for damages was filed against the
City of New York by decedent Schuster's father as administrator of his
estate, alleging that his death was due to the negligent failure of the city
to use ordinary or reasonable care for Schuster's security and protection.
The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it lacked facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. On appeal the New York Court of Ap-
peals divided three and three. After appointment of an additional justice
to sit on the case, on reargument before the Court of Appeals, held, re-
versed. A municipality has a duty, the breach of which will support a
cause of action, to exercise reasonable care for the protection against re-
taliation of a person who has aided in the enforcement of the criminal
law. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
The breach of a duty is the foundation of any liability in negligence.
Hence the problem with the instant case is to find, or create, a duty of rea-
sonable protection running from the New York City Police to an informer
who has aided them in a capture, and who reasonably appears to be in dan-
ger. Generally a duty arises from a relationship between the parties which
brings them sufficiently close together that the conduct of each can have
a substantial effect on the other. This relation may be one of activity
and space, such as is involved in the operation of an automobile, or it can
be a status relation such as "invitee" or "employee." A duty arising
from an act can be inferred from the act itself without much difficulty.
On the other hand, a duty breached by an omission, since there has been
no act, must be established on independent grounds.' Since the instant
case involved only inaction, any duty must be independently established.
'On duty generally, see Winfield, Duty in Tortios8 Negligence, 34 COLUM. 1 Rzv. 41
(1934).
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Schuster was not a mere volunteer; he responded to a public call for
information. There is upon every citizen an ancient and fundamental duty
to aid in law enforcement. The thirteenth century English citizen was
bound by law to provide himself with arms and follow the "hue and cry.'"
In addition the common law crime of misprision of felony made it unlawful
not to prevent the commission of a felony, or knowing of it, not to make it
known to the proper officials.! Admittedly, informing of the whereabouts
of a known criminal does not fall within the strict definition of mis-
prision of felony, but these common law obligations indicate the existence
of an ancient broad duty of the citizen to aid in law enforcement. Lan-
guage in federal cases further sustains this contention. In re Quarles and
Butler' states as dictum that it is both the right and duty of a citizen to
inform of the commission of a crime; and Wilson v. United States' asserts
a duty on everyone to aid in law enforcement.
The cooperation of a citizen with government, as in the instant case,
would seem therefore to create a status or relation between them which
would support a reciprocal duty. The majority opinion in the principal
case suggests the relation is agency, or employment. The citizen's duty to
cooperate should give that relation, whatever it is, an added moral quality
resulting in a relation much closer than the ordinary relation between
citizen and government; one that can charge the parties thereto with af-
firmative personal duties.
To establish a reciprocal governmental duty to protect an informer
the majority opinion cites the Quarles' case and also Motes v. United States.'
Both cases involve prosecutions under United States statutes making it a
crime to conspire to threaten or intimidate any citizen in the full exercise
of any right secured to him by the Constitution. The right involved is
the right to inform of violations of the laws of the United States. These
cases do not concern any duty on the part of the government to protect
the informer. However the Quarles case does assert that an informer, just
as a prisoner, has a right to be protected against lawless violence.
New York City has a history of police negligence cases that establish
a trend towards decisions of this type. As pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, the recognized problem in police cases is that while everyone ad-
mits the police have a broad general duty to protect the public from crime,
no individual citizen has any right to complain because that protection
failed in his particular unfortunate case. A slightly different question is
raised by the negligent acts of the police themselves. The city has been
held liable in several cases where a person has been negligently shot by
'Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928) (dictum).
'See 15 C.J.S. Compounding Offenses § 2 (1939). Although nearly non-existent as
a crime.today, misprision of felony was held to be a part of the common law of
the state of Vermont in State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 Atl. 533 (1907), and was
on the statutes of Louisiana until repealed in 1942. LA. REV. STAT., 1870, § 856.
'158 U.S. 532 (1895) (dictum).
659 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) (dictum).
°Note 4 supra.
'178 U.S. 458 (1900).
1959]
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 20 [1958], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/1
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the police.' In two additional cases the intentional acts of third persons
were involved: Lubelfeld v. City of New York' concerned a taxicab driver
who recovered for injuries when he was shot by a passenger placed in his
car by three policemen." Benway v. City of Watertown held the munici-
pality liable to a wife shot by her husband with a gun 'which had been
returned to him by police in spite of the fact that he had no permit and
had threatened her.
These two cases are especially significant because in each of them it
was held that the intentional criminal act of another should have been
foreseen and prevented by the municipality. At least that aspect of the
instant case has support. The situation in the Benway case is similar to
that of the instant case in that the police were charged with foreseeing
that the plaintiff might be assaulted; and if they were not under a duty
to protect her, were at least under a duty not to provide the means for
the assault. The Lubelfeld case is pertinent in an additional respect be-
cause there the taxi driver could be viewed as within an "employment"
relation which would give rise to a greater duty of care. The instant
case involved both the foreseeable criminal act of a third party, and a
special relationship between the plaintiff and the police. The extension of
this sequence of police negligence cases to the case of negligent omission
does not, then, seem too great.
The Quarles case and these New York cases seem to be the full range
of applicable precedent, but there are other possible theories upon which
liability might be founded. It was suggested above that Schuster could
be treated as an employee of the police. At common law an employer was
under a duty only to disclose to his employees the dangers of the employ-
ment. Yet great changes have been wrought upon the modern employer's
liability. Holdings under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which
retains negligence as a basis of liability, have imposed upon the employer
a duty to protect employees from foreseeable criminal misconduct of others."
If the theory that Schuster was an employee or agent has any validity,
these holdings are relevant.
For a short while the New York City Police did extend protection to
Schuster and his family. In so doing it could be said they recognized
their duty to do so. The concurring opinion of Justice McNally continues
from this point and establishes liability on the rule that once having as-
sumed a duty one is bound to carry out its performance without negligence.
Whether this rule always includes a duty to continue to perform as in this
case is doubtful. However the Montana Supreme Court has taken just
'Meistinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956) ; Flamer v.
City of Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E.2d 838 (1955) ; Wilkes v. City of New York,
308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E.2d 338 (1954); McCrink' v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99,
71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
'4 N.Y.2d 455, 176 N.Y.S.2d 302, 151 N.E.2d 862 (1958).
1The fact that the passenger was a drunken off-duty policeman makes no difference
for our purposes, since liability was based on the act of other policemen In placing
him in the taxi.
1 App. Div. 2d 465, 151 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1956).
'See Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 412 Ill. 568, 107 N.E.2d 735,33 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1952),
involving intentional malicious acts of another employee, and Lillie v. Thompson,
332 U.S. 459 (1947), involving criminal acts of third parties.
[Vol. 20,
3
Conklin: Schuster v. City of New York
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1958
RECENT DECISIONS
such a position in the case of Stewart v. Standard Publishing Co.' There
the defendant had taken it upon itself to clear its sidewalks of snow,
although it had no duty to do so. The court held the defendant negligent
for having failed to do so on the particular morning the plaintiff fell.
The rationale upon which a duty which was originally non-existent is
created by a mere history of acting in a particular way and without reliance
by anyone thereon is hard to comprehend. However such reasoning has
been used and could be applied to situations like the instant case.
In the long run, is there any real need to find a duty well established
by precedent in order to impose liability? Certainly no one can deny
that there is a strong moral duty to protect a citizen endangered because
of his cooperation with the police. Public policy would surely favor pro-
tection for the purpose of encouraging such action. Negligence is a broad
concept which is continually being molded to fit new situations. Indeed
the history of tort law has been the history of newly found duties. As
stated by Prosser: "Changing social conditions lead constantly to the
recognition of new duties. No better general statement can be made, than
that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable men would
recognize it and agree it exists."'
It should be noted that the instant decision would not have been pos-
sible without a far-reaching waiver of sovereign immunity. New York has
waived virtually all immunity from civil suit.' The waiver was held to
extend to all civil divisions of the state in Bernardine v. City of New York."
And in addition the New York City police cases indicate that the tradi-
tional governmental-proprietary distinction in municipal functions is not
followed."
Until the 1959 legislative session, Montana's waiver of state immunity
was very limited.' However, House Bill 237," passed this year, waives the
sovereign immunity of the state for damages caused by negligence, wrong-
ful acts, or omissions of state employees who are acting within the scope
of their employment, in any circumstance in which a private person would
be liable in damages for the same act or omission; but the waiver is limited
to the extent of insurance coverage. This of course severely limits the
effect of the new provision, because the state can still avoid any liability
under it by merely neglecting to take out insurance for tortious acts of
state employees. Further, the new statute is seemingly limited to claims
against the state itself, and does not extend to governmental subdivisions.
In all situations where the state is not insured against tort damages,
'8102 Mont. 43, 55 P.2d 694 (1936).
"PROSsER, TORTS 168 (2d ed. 1955).
The New York Court of Claims Act of 1929 § 12 (now 1 8) reads as follows: "The
state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes lia-
bility and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules
of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corpora-
tion [sic]."
1294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
"See Herzog, Ldabilty of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Fuc-
tions, 10 SYRAcusE L. REV. 30 (1958).
"See Note, 8 MONT. L. Rav. 45 (1947).
"Laws of Montana 1959, ch. 254.
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the general immunity apparently remains unchanged. The Montana Con-
stitution' provides that the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney
General, sitting as a board of examiners, must act on all claims against the
state before the legislature can consider them. Aside from express statu-
tory provision, municipalities and counties may be sued only for damages
arising out of their proprietary functions. Statutes other than the new
legislation provide that cities may be sued for negilgence in the main-
tenance of streets and ways,' except for failure to remove snow ;' and cities
are responsible for injuries to property within their corporate limits caused
by mobs or riots.'
Cases like the instant one do appear highly unusual. At least a partial
explanation lies in the very recent development of governmental liability.
Perhaps there should be a recognition that governmental liability will
uaturally involve different situations than ordinary negligence cases be-
cause of the unique functions of governing bodies. The growth of waiver
statutes and decisions like the principal case are consistent with a growing
dissatisfaction with the doctrine of sovereign immunity." It has become
recognized that the doctrine is founded upon the prerogatives of kings,
and the idea that the ultimate source of sovereign power is the sovereign
itself. Such concepts are not consistent with the modern theory that a
state's powers are derived from its subjects, and it is responsible to them.
As the doctrine of governmental irresponsibility fades away, cases of the
instant type will be more likely to occur.
WILLIAM CONKLIN
'Art. Vii, § 20.
2
'1Rvis m CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 11-1305.
Id, at § 11-1306.
'Id. at § 11-1503.
'Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313, 62 A.L.R.2d
1211 (1956).
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